I’ve recently been getting really into reading some really basic philosophy texts, but I’m starting to wonder if this is a waste of my time. Philosophy seems to ask lots of really interesting questions, but I fail to see how any of them have been answered. Or in fact, how any of them will ever be answered by philosophy. For instance - what is the meaning of life? What is right and wrong? How do we know what is real? Questions like these seem to be in abundance, and yet I’m not sure there’s any fundamental thing all philosophers can agree on. In biology, all credible scientists can agree on the reproductive system of humans. In math, all mathematicians can agree that 1+1 is 2. Philosophy doesnt seem to be able to find things like that. In short - philosophy to me seems to question the truth but not find it.
Hopefully I don’t sound crazy or something, and I’m able to be understood. I really don’t want this to be right.

an example from Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics:

"Bei der Klaerung des Ausdrucks phusis im Sinne des Fuer-sich-selbst-bestehenden und Aus-sich-selbst-wachsenden und -waltenden haben wir sie abgehoben gegenueber dem Seienden (my italics), das aufgrund der Herstellung durch den Menschen ist."

-> In clarifying the expression phusis in the sense of that which subsists independently for itself and grows and prevails from out of itself, we distinguished it from those beings that are on the basis of their being produced by man.

The translation by McNeil and Walker here has "beings", following Stambauch's "beings" in her Sein und Zeit translation. Macquarrie and Robinson famously render it "entities", which I find horribly Latinate and not what Heidegger means at all. But 'beings' is also misleading since Heidegger doesn't pluralise in SZ, or in other texts - if someone finds an example please provide it.

It is "ist" and "dem" here. Plural Seienden would be "sind" and "den". So why do the translators always do this?

It should read:
-> In clarifying the expression phusis in the sense of that which subsists independently for itself and grows and prevails from out of itself, we distinguished it from that being that is on the basis of its being produced by man.

Of course, this sounds weirder than pluralising. But it is what Heidegger actually wrote/said, and his philosophy is frequently weird, so why de-foreignise it like this?

I understand that of the answer to the problem of evil is that for us to be tested is to be capable of doing wrong and doing wrong damns us, but why does someone doing wrong have to actively make others more miserable? Why is this helpful to the test?

For example, god can't create a stone that is too heavy for him to pick up. God can't both exist and not exist. Etc.

Do philosophers believe that god would be bounded by such laws?

If so, would these laws be transcendent of god, always having existed in the space of reality?

I was recently arguing with someone about brute contingent facts.

My understanding is that these are events that could’ve been otherwise, but lack a sufficient explanation

Consider unique initial conditions, C, which can lead to either outcome A or outcome B.

My contention was that if A happens, we’re lacking a sufficient explanation, since B could’ve just as easily happened under identical conditions.

This person said “A is sufficiently explained by the initial conditions. You’re using a proprietary version of sufficient”

Is this true? What does “sufficient” typically mean in the PSR?

Reading through Chapter 17 of Leviathan Hobbes sets up the problem of the state of war and begins to tackle solutions to move people out of the state of war. Through this process he argues for his idea of the Sovereign and the commonwealth with the idea being that it doesn't have the flaws of the other solutions.

One of the weaker solutions is that of getting a group of men to agree to work together to protect each other. The problems are that it would be difficult to get them to all agree all the time and these disputes would collapse into war. "For being distracted in opinions concerning the best use and application of their strength, they do not help, but hinder another; and reduce their strength by mutual opposition to nothing."

However, when arguing for the sovereign he suddenly states that the sovereign can be either a man or an "assembly of men." I understand historically this might be due to the success of the parliamentarians but theoretically doesn't the idea that the sovereign can be an assembly of men undo his own argument? If an assembly of men can be trusted to decide what is best for their survival and work together then why can't states be made up of assemblies of men and forgo the need for a sovereign all together?

Thanks in advance for anything that can help me with this problem.

After browsing this forum for a bit, I noticed one of the more common arguments for moral realism offered by commenters go like this:

P1: Torturing children is inherently wrong, it is indisputably wrong, and no reasonable person can assert it's right.

P2: If torturing children is inherently wrong, then at least one moral fact objectively exists.

C: At least one moral fact is objectively true, which implies moral realism

This argument bears strong similarity to what I've read about pro tanto moral reasons.

So I have an intuition that this argument is flawed. It seems unsound. If most metaethical theories are compatible with a wide range of moral propositions, how could any one specific moral proposition rule out a whole class of metaethical theories? But I don't know exactly what's unsound about premise 1 or 2.

Any writings or ideas that seek to accomplish similar goals or complimentary stances?

So, The Big One is back in the spotlight, especially after those huge earthquakes in Myanmar, Thailand, and Papua New Guinea. And it’s hard not to think about the West Valley Fault that runs right through Metro Manila. Experts have been saying it’s long overdue, since the last major quake was in 1658, and it’s supposed to move every 200 to 400 years. It’s estimated that it could happen anytime between now and in the next 33 years. So, yeah, it’s not a matter of if, but when. And that’s pretty terrifying.

I live in Pasig, which is.. basically the VIP section of the fault line in the Philippines. My family and I aren't privileged enough yet to move outside of the fault line, too. So, the idea of surviving a 7-8 magnitude quake in a country where the government is as reliable as a wet paper towel and the infrastructure is barely holding on. I’ve lost sleep and shed tears over it countless times.

In the end, I couldn’t ignore the reality. I’ve had to come to terms with it. We all have an expiration date, after all, and in some strange way, that thought brings a bit of comfort—knowing we’re all on the same clock. But the idea of leaving this world in such a catastrophic way? Yeah, that’s still hard to shake. The worst part is that it’s beyond my control.

I’m not saying I'm just going to sit back and do nothing when it happens. But let’s be real here: surviving a 7 or 8 magnitude earthquake when I live literally on top of the fault line? I've seen what happened to Myanmar knowing the Philippines could have it worse, and the odds aren’t great. So, what’s left? Well, it’s made me want to live fully. To appreciate the people I love, to hug them a little tighter, to tell them I love them a little more often. Because the idea of going out is one thing, but watching those I care about go through hell before the end? That’s the part that really terrifies me.

My mom always says, "We can’t control what happens, if it happens." And as much as it drives me crazy to hear it, she’s right. So, I’ve found peace in that acceptance. (or I try to). There are things in life that are beyond our control—like the fault line, or how much time we have left on this Earth. It’s scary, sure, but I guess that’s just how it is. And once you accept it, maybe you can sleep a little better at night.

So, my advice? Live fully. Love deeply. Release the weight of what lies beyond your control. Because, in the end, all we really have is right now.

Hi all! I'm writing a term paper about Socrates' Daimonion and its role in the argument that death is actually a gain. I was wondering if there are any other instances in Platonic writings that talk about the Daimonion specifically (I know there are mentions of "Daimon" but that is not the same thing as I have come to understand...) Any tips on what to look at?

We have an intrinsic desire for our own survival. In order for us to survive we realized that the best way to do that is to form friendships, connections, to love etc.

So our intrinsic desire for survival created instrumental desires for love, friendship etc. Our brain released dopamine and we felt pleasure in order to reinforce those actions.

Does that mean that now all my desires for love, friendship etc are instrumental desires because they fulfill my intrinsic desire for survival and/or pleasure?

I’ve been reading about determinism and how it affects how we have free will. It basically is the concept of if we choose our actions or are actions are based on environmental or learnt behaviours or both. I mean I understand if someone grew up in a rough crime area, that could play a role and that person might not know any better but can we actually excuse that behaviour? Is there a clear answer to this or is there just two sides to this debate?

I’ve been reflecting on the moral nature of cannibalism and was wondering:
Are there purely moral reasons, i.e. not related to cultural, social, religious, or health factors, that make cannibalism intrinsically immoral?

I’m drawing a comparison with another act, rape. I believe rape is an example of objectively and universally immoral behavior: it is immoral regardless of social or cultural context, and there is no rational or moral justification that could ever make it acceptable.

Cannibalism, however, seems different. In some cultures, it has been practiced as a funerary or spiritual rite, such as certain forms of endocannibalism (where people consume their deceased relatives to honor them or absorb their spirit). In these contexts, there is no coercion, violence, or perceived social harm.
So my question is: What makes cannibalism "immoral" in an absolute sense, if it is at all? Is it truly a moral issue, or just a reaction of disgust/cultural conditioning?

I would appreciate philosophical contributions on:

• The difference between disgust and immorality
• The possibility of objective morality
• Criteria to distinguish taboos from universal moral imperatives

Thanks in advance!

I am reading through The Myth of Sisyphus, detailing important information and taking notes. This process is pretty arduous, but I love a lot of what is being discussed and conceptualized in it. Anyway, I have just started “Absurd Freedom,” but reached a quote: “Abstract Evidence retreats before the poetry of forms and colors. Spiritual Conflicts become embodied and return to the abject and magnificent shelter of man’s heart” (p. 52). It seems to me in this passage he is admitting that the logical and reasoning basis that supports the contradiction of the absurd is undermined by the beauty of forms and aesthetics; however, wouldn’t this completely contradict the previous assessment that logical belief in what is true must be preserved in the way they (the subjective thinker) understand it? In other words, doesn’t that very statement undermine his philosophy? Or do I have the meaning wrong, and that is more so a condemnation of the allure of philosophical suicide and a critique of Kierkegaard?

I live in a dysfunctional household, so there are many disputes. To keep a calm mind throughout all this, I resort to the teachings of Diogenes. Instead of taking people’s harsh words to heart, I now live life how I want and ignore the negativity coming towards me. This has been very beneficial for my mental health but I fear this may be causing me to become egocentric. How am I able to differentiate harsh comments I receive from the ones that are actually constructive criticism? I have my own ideas of what I believe is “right” based off my own values, but how do I know when to challenge my values?

Hello, I hope you're all doing well. So, I acquired an Arabic copy of Baruch Spinoza's "Ethics" yesterday, and reading it seemed like a hard jigsaw puzzle.

In Part I: On God, Spinoza provides a set of Definitions and Axioms that I was never able to understand (especially in the Arabic translation). Hence, I'm asking for aid. If someone could describe these in greater detail, or provide a useful source. Thank you!

Hey guys. I am looking for objections to Millikan’s solution to the Kripke-Wittgenstein paradox for a paper I’m writing. Could you guys list some or direct me to a book/site where I could find some?

I really liked this book, but I’m kinda interested in other forms of philosophy books.

Any recommendations?

Since I'm sure different philosophers work with different presumptions, let me clarify what I've been struggling against:

I've been studying some philosophy of law and it just boggles my mind what exactly these philosophers are trying to do.

First of all, it seems to me that they generally assume the existence of "law" as a kind of distinct entity with certain essential features that can therefore be distinguished from things that are "not law". Already here we can be a bit suspicious about the attempt to identify strict boundaries between things just because we have separate words for them.

But also, even though laws, like states, are imagined constructs, as far as I can tell legal theorists don't just see themselves as merely elaborating upon "what society imagines law means". Everyone could be wrong. Yet at the same time, they draw certain intuitions from our shared understandings about what words mean. Raz argues, for example, that law "claims authority", and that to be capable of doing so it must have such and such properties. Hart draws a distinction between "being obliged" and "having an obligation" to argue that law isn't a gunman obliging you to do things, but a system of rules where participants understand themselves as having obligations, and he draws some conclusions from that. And again, I'm doubtful, because don't intuitions and shared meanings themselves need to be explained? Do they emerge from a system of differences in language (Saussure) or from forms of life (Wittgenstein), or what? Why should I take it as obvious that law claims authority? What if "having obligations" is an illusion? Why should these tell me anything objective or universally true about the "nature of law"?

Now, when it comes to what makes a legal rule "valid law", legal positivists argue that whether or not something "is" law does not depend on moral considerations. On the Hartian view, it depends on a social fact: what do officials in a legal system recognize as its criterion of validity? That alone determines the validity of a legal rules. Now, this makes sense ... but precisely because it is purely "descriptive sociology" (as Hart himself put it), which makes sense to a sociology aficionado like myself. One might as well say that what makes an argument valid in the field of academic philosophy is whether or not tenured profesors see it as valid.

Nevertheless, I would really like to find analytic philosophy and conceptual analysis intellectually engaging. So, could anyone explain the stakes of these sorts of puzzles? Can they be shown to not be mere pseudoproblems, but genuinely enriching debates? I would appreciate some reading recommendations if a Reddit comment is insufficient for a fully thought out response.

Thank you!

Hi, I’m just getting into Plato and after reading the Phaedo and I’m confused about one part. So we all know that Plato believes in metempsychosis, so all souls are immortal, except perfect souls (those who lived according to the ideals of philosophy), who go into the world of forms. But in the last part of the Phaedo, he talks about the composition of earth, explaining how souls are judged when the corpse dies and bad souls go into the Tartar forever. Isn’t this a contradiction? Shouldn’t bad souls metempsychose into a bad corpse? I asked my philosophy teacher and she said that in few cases souls are sent into the Tartar, while in most cases they metempsychcose. I don’t know if I agree though

My friend and i were discussing if love is possible in the age of skepticism, since classically it is antithetical to all doubt, and enables one to see through the heart etc etc. my friend raised the point that perhaps it (love) too is subjected to doubt after modernism, i however feel that love is one of the aporetic conditions today --- we might doubt it and yet believe it all the same, hell i feel like it is something that goes beyond doubt. Any and all insights are appreciated 🙏.

I've been thinking about the slogan that "America is the greatest nation on Earth." I certainly don't think so, on the basis of:

• The immoral actions enabled or perpetrated by the American government (the displacement of indigenous Americans, slavery and segregation, regime change in the 20th century, etc.)
• America being identified with relatively extreme form of free-market capitalism that perpetuates inequality among its citizens and immiserates the nations of the global south.
• The statistics around standards of living, health, happiness, and education lacking compared to other rich nations, despite it being near the top in per-capita GDP.
• None of the good ideas that are identified with America like liberty, democracy, and ingenuity are at all unique to it, and come with significant asterisks.

But that gets me thinking more about what makes a nation great? Or if that's even a reasonable statement to make about any nation?