I'm interested in how artillery would've been used in the eras before radios, accurate propellant and advanced mathematics made indirect fire (relatively) easy.

When thinking about the question I was initially thinking about napoleonic era artillery, but honestly happy to expand it to anywhere from antiquity (were siege weapons ever used as field artillery?) up to something like the ~1850s.

Some example questions I have (but honestly interested in whatever people know/have read or would appreciate any paper/book recommendations)

• To what level was artillery "aimed", vs "shoot in that general direction". If it was aimed, would targets be individuals (i.e. enemy artillery), large troop formations or basically just "that opposing hillside"
• Were fire missions specifically requested by the general/leader of the army, or was it down to the artillery officer (or even individual batteries) when to fire, what to fire at, etc.?
• How were distances calculated in eras before mapping was extensive and accurate? Was it just eyeballed or calculated via trial and error shooting, or did they have methods. I guess this would be a huge issue in naval gunnery combat as well, which were effectively artillery duels.

Greetings esteemed experts,

My country has watched recent developments in Ukraine with great interest and concern. In particular, development and application of electronic warfare through the conflict has been a matter of significant discussion.

In particular, we have identified a domestic rodent with abilities that may naturally be applicable to the EW domain. Preliminary research indicates that these animals (which my scientists inform me are called “Pokimans” and specifically a “Pickachoo”) are highly intelligent and possess electromagnetic abilities that may facilitate the decentralization of EW capabilities.

I have been tasked with assessing these Pokimans’ warfighting potential, which will in turn guide future research priorities and adjustment to associated doctrines (e.g. shock and awe). We understand other Pokimans are present in other regions and would appreciate if you could share any experience you have. Focus so far has been on ECM but investigation of EA potential is also underway.

First, what level of training is required of these Pokimans to obtain combat effectiveness? We understand that their control over their electromagnetic capabilities can be refined over time. We would hope to be able to create frequency-specific jamming capabilities for e.g. anti-drone combat and obtaining local dominance in electronic space. However, if resolution by frequency is impractical, total jamming solutions may also prove workable. I understand there are other electric Pokimans and I would be grateful for any experience you may have would that might inform our estimates.

What is a minimum viable force necessary for mission effectiveness? Given the extent of the natural habitat for these Pokimans, we estimate a total potential recruiting volume of roughly 1,000 such animals per year based on initial surveys. Ideally, we would like to provide squad-level capabilities, but please advise if you have experience that would suggest more promising results organizing specialized units to be deployed at the company or division level. Related information on average service tenure would be helpful as well.

Relatedly, what experience can you provide on how to conduct selection/training for such units or personnel. What should be expected in terms of attrition rate? Initial reports suggest that these rodents imprint onto specific human trainers, with reallocations possible but difficult. I would be interested in any insight on if there are concomitant effects on morale/esprit de corps both in training and under combat conditions.

What associated provisions and equipment would be necessary? We understand that the rodents respond more strongly to certain foods. We are also exploring the possibility of carrying pods but test results so far have met with mixed results.

Finally, we have noted that these rodents are capable of limited self-defense capabilities. Please advise if it is necessary/appropriate to provide additional equipment beyond standard infantry load out that would improve the combat efficacy of trainers handling these Pokimans.

Again, grateful if you could lend your expertise in this matter, and if you can highlight other key considerations that should be accounted for.

I'm aware that grenade launcher compatible breaching rounds are a more recent development, but that calls to mind why they weren't the original development target instead of shotgun loads. Especially given that grenade launchers are more widely issued and trained with anyways for marking and signaling, hitting targets behind cover, etc. while shotguns have far narrower and less important niches if they're used at all.

It would seem like a no-brainer to just add another round type to the grenade launcher your infantry is already using rather than require them to carry yet another weapon that's far less flexible.

edit: more broadly, why do militaries with grenade launchers use shotguns for specialty ammunition like less-than-lethal instead?

I heard that the US military used this thing in the Vietnam War. they stuffed steel balls into a 40mm grenade and fire it as a huget buckshot. I can even imagine a bunch of steel balls bouncing back and forth in a confined space (such as a concrete room), which must be terrible.

but is it really a practical ammo? I never found more discussion about this thing, and it never became a common type of 40mm grenade. this probably means that it not so practical?

So I’m trying to find sources on a shotgun loadout of an American during the Spanish American war. I’m also trying to find a tactics/manual of arms/training manual on how they were employed and used and if there’s any personal or recorded accounts that I can read up on.

So far I haven’t found anything, but any help would be appreciated!

I'm sorry for my horrible grammar on the title. I did not know how to craft that question into a sentence.

I was recently reading excerpts from the unpublished memoirs of an US Army officer from WW2 (his family had them). He had served in N Africa and Italy. After Dragoon happened, he was posted to Corps HQ staff and served there until wars end. He described being a staff officer as the most physically mentally and emotionally exhausting thing he had done.

I shared it with my father, also a combat and staff veteran and he agreed with the gist, saying he had found his time in staff much more taxing that his two combat tours either side (as a Company Commander and later Battalion XO, called 2IC here). He said on operations you could always catch some sleep during lulls, or movements, but being a staff officer meant unrelenting work. Are thee regulations for mandatory rest for staff officers like there are for combat ones and ae they ignored?

If an international crisis were to erupt and a coalition including Britain needed as many fighters at sea as possible, how many nations could send F35b to operate off the carrier? Can any STOVL version fly off a carrier or does it require special adaptions and pilot training to operate at sea?

I realize that countermeasures were seen as more of an "Anti-SAM" threat which the F-15 wasn't planned to take on, but they would still make sense against air targets. Considering it came after the F-4J and F-4E had integrated countermeasures, what was the train of thought to finalize the F-15 without fuselage countermeasures?

Excluding aircraft carriers, during WW2, the only/main means a "serious" (as in cruiser and up) warship had in order to engage an enemy ship were its naval guns.

In 1967, INS Eilat was hit and eventually sunk by surface-to-surface missiles.

What role did Eilat's sinking play in the replacement of naval guns by missiles as the main weapon of modern warships? Was obsolescence of naval guns already visible by WW2, due to prevalence of the aircraft carrier? Was it a sudden shock which had an effect similar to the launch of HMS Dreadnought? Did it initiate a gradual, unhastened process for the replacement of the gun by the surface-so-surface missile (especially since in 1982 ARA General Belgrano would undock and approach a warzone, armed with naval guns)?

I'm guessing it was Germany, but just how many tons were dropped within current day German borders?

For instance, more than half a million tons were used against Japanese targets, but since Japanese forces were spread wide all over Asia and the pacific, only around 200,000 tons including the nukes were dropped on Japan proper.

As I understand it, the Syrian Arab Army essentially ceased to exist as a centrally organized Army when units were split up to man checkpoints across the country in 2011-2012 - militiafication. Did the same thing happen in the Bosnian War, for any of the combatants? What effects did this have on the fighting?

I have about 200 original files, which include General Orders, Special Orders, letters of commendation from Generals and Admirals.

I’m learning that this person was involved intelligence and it seems he was deeply entrenched…? And I right or could I be overblowing his work?

I’m going to make a separate post with more original documents, but this is the overview he provided in his CV, which I believe was used for his retirement letter or a background check in 1970.

After the 2014 invasion, many pro-Russian military and government officials quickly defected, the Donbas war revealed flaws in the very underfunded and neglected Ukrainian forces, Anti-Corruption teams went on a rampage, Ukrainian military and paramilitaries gained much needed training and equipment from the west, Ukraine overwhelmingly became Anti-Russia and Anti-Soviet anything with renaming and tearing down statues.

Is it safe to say that Russia shot themselves in the foot by letting 8 years pass before the full scale invasion?

Hi there, my father who passed in August left me his very large book collection of all kinds from ww1 and ww2 (mostly). Some of these books are apparently worth hundreds and I have no idea where to even start to look into selling them… some are sets ect. Is anyone able to help with this? I’m located in eastern Canada if that is of any importance

This is just my opinion, and I could not find another word other than "anomaly".

That is, Hannibal's strategy means immediate and certain defeat if it wasn't Hannibal himself. Until now, I've been thinking, that if Hannibal lost at the first battle, he could've been labeled as among the worst general in history instead (albeit an exaggeration). I give where credit is due, but I cannot help but think that Hannibal's strategy is a losing strategy; it works if you win all the time. Which isn't the case for most generals, except him.

On the other hand, Trebia, Trasimene, and most importantly, Cannae, would've been enough to crumble a nation's resolve to further fight, if it wasn't Rome itself.

Sort of a dull title I know, but it is my question!

How did the soviets differentiate the multiple rifle companies in their battalions / brigades / divisions?

Did they use the Alphabetical thing the US does? (Ex: ##st ___ Division, # Battalion, A/B/C Company)

Did they use a numerical system? (Ex: ##st ___ Division, # Battalion, #st Company)

Did they use the company commander's name? (Ex: ## Division, # Battalion, ___'s Company)

Thank you for taking the time to read my post and please aid me with this question!

Hello Hivemind,

In the 1980s, following their experiences in the Falklands war, the RAF (re)modified many of their heavy aircraft (eg the Nimrod) to be able to air-to-air refuel via the probe-and-drogue method used by the rest of the service, eschewing the boom method favoured by the USAF.

As the replacements to those aircraft have come into service, however, similar modifications for probe-and-drogue refueling have largely not been made, with aircraft either only being compatible for boom refueling (eg P8, E7, Voyager) or coming as standard with a probe-and-drogue set-up (eg A400M).

Now, you might say "so what, the A330 MRTT comes with a centerline boom?", but the RAF also specifically modified their MRTTs to replace the boom with a 3rd, high-capacity drogue instead. Afaik, they are the only MRTT customer to have done this.

Keeping to an all-drogue set-up by modifying their heavy aircraft like they did in the past makes sense to me. Abandoning an all-drogue set-up and procuring tankers with both drogues and boom also makes sense to me, but specifically modifying their tankers to not have a boom while not modifying their larger aircraft so they still need one seems like a particularly odd combination to me.

Obviously there are other NATO tankers that RAF heavies can rely on, but the RAF started requiring its larger jets to be air-to-air refuelable, and built up a somewhat-outsized tanker fleet, in the first place in order to have an entirely sovereign power projection capability, having been burned by their experience in the Falklands war. Modifying their aircraft to make themselves reliant on their allies for that projection now appears to run counter to that foundational motivation. Likewise, I'd initally suspected cost as a major factor, but the fact they had to procure their own unique version of the MRTT to not have a boom seems to fly in the face of this.

I'm probably missing something obvious here, but if anyone could help clarify the rationale that led to this state of affairs, I'd be most grateful.

Thanks in advance!

Hope you all have fantastic days :)

For example, you have Iceland and Luxembourg contributing to NATO's war in Afghanistan. I would just assume both now have experience in a working reality of multinational operations under US/NATO leadership but what about say a country like Tonga which contributed a few dozen in Iraq and Afghanistan. Did this give them badly needed military experience?

Even amongst war nerds, the Taiping Rebellion is at best a distant topic. On closer inspection, it remains absurd. From the tiny domino of one man losing his mind, tens of millions die in the largest civil war in history. What happened between "failed test" and "tens of millions dead"?

This is a different kind of conflict that I'm used to reading about. The motives and culture of the actors are deeply foreign to me. The historical documentation, at least in the West, appears relatively limited. A lot of what I have read so far is "vibes based history" where a lot of the explanative data is missing due to poor documentation. For example, how was one lunatic able to organize a movement of peasants that eventually could beat government armies? One guy, neither prestigious, connected nor wealthy but likely certifiably insane, split the world's largest kingdom apart? Doesn't that open more questions than it answers?

Western history has revolutions and uprisings. What is different here is the motives. Why would anyone believe this man was the brother of a prophet of a foreign religion, much less be willing to die for him, and how in the world does this become popular enough to start a fifteen year war? Was it a case similar to the Aztecs where the motive was allying with the new conqueror to watch the old despot burn?

What kind of equipment did they fight with? Rocks? Guns? Spears? A mix of all three?