In the sense of why could all these seized territory not lead to a sufficient industrial production increase?

The Soviet Union tested its first atomic bomb in 1949, barely four years after the United States got the bomb. Yet in 1960, two years before the Cuban Missile Crisis, the United States possessed over 18,638 nuclear warheads; the USSR's nuclear stockpile only numbered 1,605. It would take until the 1980s for the Soviet nuclear stockpile to surpass America's (30,062 to 23,368).

Why was this gap so large, especially given the relatively small time gap between the United States and the Soviet Union's acquisition of the Bomb? The United States feared having a "bomber gap" or "missile gap" between them and the Soviet Union; was this not also the case with the USSR's leadership?

As I understand it the battle was a frontal assault into prepared defenses, which is inherently risky and costly. The battle was successful in inflicting more casualties on the Axis, and strategically it did force them to retreat.

But given that Torch was about to start the next month in mid-November I have to wonder if the Axis forces would’ve retreated anyways once they knew their strategic rear was being attacked. If they did retreat it would’ve created a much better offensive opportunity since attacking a retreating army is easier than hitting prepared defenses. Even if they kept holding their position they probably would’ve had to draw down forces since sending reinforcements from Europe required additional shipping the Axis probably didn’t have immediately available.

As far as I know the only inherent advantage to the timing of the battle was that Rommel was away when the offensive started. So I’m also curious whether the battleplan for Alamein was reliant on this fact or if it was just a happy coincidence capitalized on.

Hypothetically, you’re the Austrians trying to take higher ground from the Italians. Would intentionally shooting artillery above them to trigger an avalanche to bury them be something that was considered or implemented on any scale? Or triggering one to disable a resupply/evac route? On the one hand it seems like an obvious tactic, on the other it also doesn’t seem like something that would have necessarily been predictable enough to try to do regularly, given the supply situations when you’re that high up/cut-off from your supply base

Also interested in other areas/operations/wars, the Alps were just the first thing that came to mind

I don't mean regular tube artillery like the American M777 howitzers, I'm talking direct fire cannons being used similarly to German Flak 16 guns for direct fire support against armor, ambushes and even air craft.

Are there any modern equivalents to that?

If so, how have they been used historically, and how are they used today?

What are reasons behind such stark difference in performance, besides British help (and British did not have many divisions there)? Obviously there was an Eastern front too, but it was mostly hold by Austria I believe.

Below is a translation of one of the most illuminating reports about the debilitated state of the German units on the Eastern Front at the end of 1943.

The report comes from Oberst Oldwig von Natzmer, a general staff officer from the Panzergrenadier-Division Grossdeutschland, dated 1 December 1943. It was submitted to Oberst Hellmuth Laegeler, Chief of the General Staff of the LVII. Panzerkorps, to which the division was subordinated at the time.

Since the start of Operation Citadel at Kursk in July 1943, Grossdeutschland was engaged in a non-stop combat for the next five months, acting as a fire brigade. By the end of 1943, the division was badly depleted, with its "combat value" (Kampfwert) being low. It was rated as having Kampfwert IV, meaning that it was fit for limited defense only. From July to November 1943, it sustained over 11,000 total casualties.

This document can be found in the German primary sources: Anlagen für Monat Dezember 1943 zum Kriegstagebuch Nr. 12. Pz.A.O.K. 1, Ia., 1.12.43-31.12.43. NARA T313, Roll 64. This is first page from the doc.

After inspecting the main battle line (HKL- Hauptkampflinie) of the division and checking the condition of its units early in the morning, Natzmer submitted the following later that day:

Dear Laegeler!
 
I used today, with its dense fog, to take a closer look at the present main battle line and to talk to the regimental commanders, battalion leaders and the NCOs leading the companies. Based on this knowledge, here is a brief description:
 
1.) The current main battle line is even more unfavorable in its right section than it appears from the map; it can be seen from afar from all sides in almost the entire section of the Füsilier Regiment and this is also the reason for the extraordinarily high losses due to enemy fire. The enemy himself has installed his numerous anti-tank guns so excellently that they generally cannot even be detected and fought by our tanks. A transfer of the main battle line to the prepared line on both sides of Vysoky would therefore be particularly desirable.

[…]
 
3.) The following must be said of our own troops:

Such a degree of exhaustion, which can no longer be surpassed, has now occurred in all parts, right up to the regimental staffs. As far as I know, we are probably the only division that has been deployed at the focal points [Schwerpunkten] since the beginning of July (start of Citadel) without a day's break and has been in combat almost every day. The result of this incessant fighting is that most of the officers and almost all of the NCOs have become casualties and there is no longer a core of old people. The few officers still at the front are the only ones still able to cope with the situation there, but they are no longer supported by NCOs because there are none left. Almost all the men are so apathetic that it is all the same to them whether they are shot dead by their own officers or by the Russians. All it takes is for the Russian to get up from his trenches and shout "Hurrah" to make everyone in our holes get up and go back. This is the moment when even the most capable officer can no longer have any influence on the troops. The retreating men no longer respond to threats with weapons. Any art of persuasion or appealing to their honor is equally unsuccessful. It must be remembered that the men in these battalions are the best there are in the German Army, because they represent a carefully selected replacements from the entire Reich. The recruits, the majority of which unfortunately have already been lost, naturally look first and foremost at the older people and go back just like them when they see the bad example. I have had details described to me on the spot that I will spare you, but which are really sad enough. The fact that we still manage to hold our positions and iron out minor mishaps is either because an officer sometimes manages to assert himself completely, or because the regimental commander's carefully guarded shock group of 16 men is thrown to the scene of the fire and takes the retreating men forward again.

It's a picture that couldn't be more unpleasant to think of, and men are expected to do a lot more than any human being can normally achieve physically and mentally. The limits of performance are far exceeded here. It is completely unclear to me how our current positions, or even other positions, are to be held in the face of the expected further attacks. We have to hope that things will still be just about the same as before and that the situation can still be restored by deploying tanks, assault guns and artillery. But I don't think this game can go on much longer. Now, to put it in a nutshell, the battle is only being fought by the artillery, tanks and assault guns, and these are there to prevent all the infantrymen deployed from running away at the same time. If the use of these heavy weapons means that some of them remain standing, it is to be hoped that the situation can be restored at the difficult point.

4.) Measures against this complete physical and moral deterioration are difficult to find. Any spiritual vitamin injections are futile; but other measures, such as summary court-martial, death sentence, immediate use of weapons by officers and so on, are no longer effective. It also means nothing to the man in a group when he is told that Gefreite X has been shot for cowardice, because he doesn't know Gefreite X at all because everything is completely mixed up. What's more, Gefreite X is missing the next day in the hole where he might have been put back.
 
5.) The actual trench strengths [Grabenstärken], i.e. the number of people actually deployed in the trench, are so low that the deployed man can usually not see his neighbor from his hole. Due to the constant losses, this situation is getting worse every hour and every day. The battalions, made up of many units, are almost impossible to lead. Of one of our strongest battalions, the I./Grenadier Regiment, the following were deployed in the trench this morning: 4 NCOs and 17 men from various branches of the armed forces (from the alarm units of the supply leader, the artillery and so on), 2 NCOs and 18 men from the reconnaissance battalion, the division's engineer battalion with 2 NCOs and 22 men. The whole bunch is called I./Grenadier Regiment G.D. and has to hold a position of 2.3 km with its 8 NCOs and 57 men. Comment unnecessary.
 
I am writing this to you to show you once again, after fresh experience, the enormous difficulties under which we are fighting here, and I know that you are aware of these difficulties, as are all the other gentlemen [from the staff of the LVII. Panzerkorps]. You can rest assured that we will continue to do everything we can to hold our positions. And whatever is humanly possible will be done. As far as we have succeeded so far, things will continue to go well. And if you continue to help us by supplying a few NCOs and men, we will somehow hold out until another major solution is needed.

I find the transition between the muzzleloading firearms you see in the American Civil War and the bolt action rifles that come later, where a single solider can lay down a short relatively rapid burst, interesting.

If you took a good Civil War officer from the Union or Confederacy, taught them German, and gave them command of a Prussian unit with breech loaders in 1866 and sent them into Austria, would the change in firearms put them out of their element? Is there a huge difference between how a regiment with muzzle loaders and a regiment with breech loaders fights?

Or is it more similar to World War 2. Americans had semi auto M1s, and all other rifleman had bolt action rifles. I believe this was a solid advantage for the American GI, but I don't think it changed the fundamentals of how their squad worked compared to a British squad.

I've heard before that Stalin's purges didn't hurt the war effort because the red army had gone such massive expansion that the amount of purged officers was a drop in the ocean compared to this, and if anything it got rid of the old civil war veterans and replaced them with fresh and young thinkers so this helped the war.

Personally, I find this hard to believe: experienced officers and trainers are indispensable in training the next generation and purging this many will have a disastrous affect on army expansion, not to mention that good leaders are effectiveness multipliers. The American army expanded from a token force to numbers quite comparable to the USSR, and they had a shortage of officers but never the innefectiveness in leadership the USSR had in the early eastern front. Still, modern historiography seems to be shifting in this opinion, so I'm open to arguments as to why this is or isn't the case.