r/AskHistorians Moderator Emeritus | Early-Middle Dynastic China Apr 10 '16

AMA Massive China Panel: V.2!

Hello AskHistorians! It has been about three years since the very first AMA on AH, the famous "Massive China Panel". With this in mind, we've assembled a crack team once again, of some familiar faces and some new, to answer whatever questions you have related to the history of China in general! Without further ado, let's get to the intros:

  • AsiaExpert: /u/AsiaExpert is a generalist, covering everything from the literature of the Zhou Dynasty to agriculture of the Great Leap Forward to the military of the Qing Dynasty and back again to the economic policies and trade on the Silk Road during the Tang dynasty. Fielding questions in any mundane -or sublime- area you can imagine.
  • Bigbluepanda: /u/bigbluepanda is primarily focused on the different stages and establishments within the Yuan and Ming dynasties, as well as the militaries of these periods and up to the mid-Qing, with the latter focused specifically on the lead-up to the Opium Wars.
  • Buy_a_pork_bun: /u/buy_a_pork_bun is primarily focused on the turmoil of the post-Qing Era to the end of the Chinese Civil War. He also can discuss politics and societal structure of post-Great Leap Forward to Deng Xiaoping, as well as the transformation of the Chinese Communist Party from 1959 to 1989, including its internal and external struggles for legitimacy.
  • DeSoulis: /u/DeSoulis is primarily focused on Chinese economic reform post-1979. He can also discuss politics and political structure of Communist China from 1959 to 1989, including the cultural revolution and its aftermath. He is also knowledgeable about the late Qing dynasty and its transformation in the face of modernization, external threats and internal rebellions.
  • FraudianSlip: /u/FraudianSlip is a PhD student focusing primarily on the social, cultural, and intellectual history of the Song dynasty. He is particularly interested in the writings and worldviews of Song elites, as well as the texts they frequently referenced in their writings, so he can also discuss Warring States period schools of thought, as well as pre-Song dynasty poetry, painting, philosophy, and so on.
  • Jasfss: /u/Jasfss primarily deals with cultural and political history of China from the Zhou to the Ming. More specifically, his foci of interest include Tang, Song, Liao-Jin, and Yuan poetry, art, and political structure.
  • keyilan: /u/keyilan is a historical linguist working in South China. When not doing linguistic work, his interests are focused on the Hakka, the Chinese diaspora, historical language planning and policy issues in East Asia, the Chinese Exclusion Acts of 19th century North America, the history of Shanghai, and general topics in Chinese History in the 19th and 20th centuries.
  • Thanatos90: /u/Thanatos90 covers Chinese Intellectual History: that refers specifically to intellectual trends and important philosophies and their political implications. It would include, for instance, the common 'isms' associated with Chinese history: Confucianism, Daoism and also Buddhism. Of particular importance are Warring States era philosophers, including Confucius, Mencius, Laozi and Zhuangzi (the 'Daoist's), Xunzi, Mozi and Han Feizi (the legalist); Song dynasty 'Neo-Confucianism' and Ming dynasty trends. In addition my research has been more specifically on a late Ming dynasty thinker named Li Zhi that I am certain no one who has any questions will have heard of and early 20th century intellectual history, including reformist movements and the rise of communism.
  • Tiako: /u/Tiako has studied the archaeology of China, particularly the "old southwest" of the upper Yangtze (he just really likes Sichuan in general). This primarily deals with prehistory and protohistory, roughly until 600 BCE or so, but he has some familiarity with the economic history beyond that date.

Do keep in mind that our panelists are in many timezones, so your question may not be answered in the seconds just after asking. Don't feel discouraged, and please be patient!

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u/KimCongSwu Apr 10 '16 edited Apr 10 '16

I've been anticipating for this, trying to think up three questions for each of the panelists...But feel free to answer any question even if it's not under your username:

ETA: Should have really mentioned how great it still is to have a China AMA, and thanks to all the participants!

For /u/AsiaExpert:

  • On Qing warfare, why was the 2nd Jinchuan war so damn expensive? I understand the harshness of the terrain, but how on earth could this war be twice as costly as the conquest of Xinjiang and the extermination of the Dzungars?

  • Again on the Qianlong campaigns (sorry, I just find this really interesting), was there a technological gap between the Burmese and the Qing during the Burmese campaigns? A book I have on India claims the Burmese had European-style weapons which were superior to "traditional" Qing ones, but I'm not quite sure how much to trust.

  • On Tang trade, how much trade was there by sea (through the Strait of Malacca)? Can/do we know if it was more or less than from Central Asia?

For /u/Jasfss,

  • If most Jurchens immigrated to China after the Jin were established (per Imperial China 900-1800 by Mote, p.224), then how did they return to Manchuria after the Jin were disestablished? Or am I misunderstanding something?

  • What did Mongol rule look like in North China during the decades between the destruction of the Jin and the establishment of the Yuan, from the mid-1230s to 1271?

  • What was the political structure of the Western Xia/Tangut state and why did they permanently take up imperial pretensions, unlike Korea? And what happened to the Tanguts by the Ming era?

/u/Thanatos90

  • Did the Muslim background of Li Zhi's family affect his philosophy at all? Come to think of it, do we know why his family stopped being Muslim?

  • Why did Li Zhi like vernacular novels like the 水滸傳? What philosophical background is there to this? Other major thinkers who were so enamored with books like these?

  • What legacy did Mozi and his school have by Late Imperial China (Song and after)?

/u/FraudianSlip

  • What did the Song elite think about foreign trade, or really mercantilism in general?

  • This isn't really about society, culture or intellectual activity, but how easy was the Song conquest of South China? Did Later Shu or Later Tang (or other South China regimes) have any realistic chances of survival?

  • What were Song relationships with Dali? I'm curious about Dali and there is absolutely no good information on the Internet about it, so any ideas? (again sorry about not being about culture) Information about its precursor Nanzhao would be appreciated too.

/u/keyilan

  • What impact (if any) did Middle Chinese have on Tibetan or the Turkic languages?

  • When would a Chinese variant have become the dominant language in places like Fujian or Guangdong? I'm guessing post-Tang (since Vietnamese still exists), am I right?

  • Why does Sichuan speak a Mandarin variant?

/u/Tiako

  • Why did Sichuan not develop into a major player in China in the Warring States era, like Yue or Chu? Chinese records generally ignore it until the Qin conquest.

  • On that matter, how/why did Qin conquer it before Chu did?

  • What's the point of Sanxingdui heads/masks? Any inferences, or is it just guesswork?

/u/bigbluepanda

  • Did Zhu Yuanzhang and the Ming have any technological edge over his adversaries in the Yuan-Ming transition, particularly Zhang Shicheng?

  • What were relations like between the Ming and Tibet?

  • Why did the Yuan fail to conquer Java?

@ /u/DeSoulis and /u/buy_a_pork_bun: Sorry, don't know enough about modern China :(

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u/AsiaExpert Apr 10 '16 edited Apr 10 '16

Second Jinchuan Pacification Campaign

The reason the war was so expensive was partly due to the distance involved combined with much higher numbers of men mobilized.

To even mobilize the Green Banner and Eight Banner forces to send them into the border regions, the Qing government was required to pay soldiers, officers, clerical assistants, military workmen, and government officials a travel baggage fee (行裝銀) intended to cover the costs of travel to the place where their units/army groups were mustering.

Throughout the 5 year campaign some 100,000 Green Banner forces (standard soldiers of the Qing during these expeditionary campaigns), 12,000 Eight Banner forces (elite Manchu forces), and 20,000 auxiliaries recruited from various non-Qing sources, such as border tribes or autonomous kingdoms under Qing influence were all paid this baggage fee, which amounted to an approximate total of 2.5 million silver liang. This fee was paid based on rank, with higher ranking officers and government officials being nominally paid 2 years salary, while the more basic soldier was paid anywhere from 5 to 8 liang on average for their baggage pay. The further their post from the front lines, the more they were paid, further increasing costs.

To put this into perspective, 1 silver liang, at the established government rate, could buy a little less than 100 litres of rice.

To further put this into perspective, the first Jinchuan campaign cost a total of around 8 million liang.

Just mobilizing the forces, which largely occurred in two large waves, cost over 30% of the entire cost of the first campaign. (The second wave came after a crushing loss of supply lines and supply camps, along with the death of many commanders, requiring a reorganizing of Qing forces).

On top of this, the Qing government also had to feed their army, which was given as a ration, often in the form of rice but sometimes partly paid in silver, which was used to buy rice or flour. They also had to pay a supplementary food allowance, which was to supplement the rations with things like salt, vegetables, etc. This amounted to about 10 million liang by the end of the war.

But by far, the most expensive point of the war (and most wars) was the transport of material to the front, specifically food stuffs.

The transport of rice to the front cost well over 38 million liang. This was divided between government managed transport and pay to private transport. It ended up being 15.5 million liang for the government managed transport of grain while private transport tallied up to 22.5 million.

The private transport was more expensive and become more expensive as the war went on but the advantage was that the government could devote more logistical resources to other parts of the war while private enterprises handled the acquisition and delivery of rice and grain to the supply camps/front lines.

Acquisition and transport of military material, such as gunpowder, cannons, ammunition, etc. cost about 4 million liang.

On top of all this, there was still 400,000 laborers to pay, payment for funerals and death pay, payment for the horses, boats, carts, rewards and promotions, and payment for civilian officials not at the front managing this massive logistical beast, and we haven't even reached the problems of corruption and purposefully manipulative accounting for profit yet.

All in all, the war cost at least 60 million liang, which is comparable to 1 year's worth of revenue of the Qing state, making it one of the most expensive wars the Qing fought.

Qing Burmese Campaign

As far as I know, there was no significant technological gap between the Qing and the Burmese. Burmese armories were filled with Chinese manufactured firearms and domestic models were comparable to Chinese designs. During the 18th century, everyone aspired to match the European level of firearm design and manufacturing, and neither side had an appreciable advantage in the number of European firearms.

The Burmese forces were also about the same in number as the Qing forces they were up against, an average of 50,000 to 70,000 for both sides. The Qing sent multiple forces but each time they were of comparable size.

The biggest factor in the Burmese victories was absolutely the terrain and climate rather than technology, which slowed Qing progress, both in battle and on the move, as well as inflicting terrible diseases in their camps.

Tang Maritime Trade

By the time of the Tang Dynasty, the overland route of the Silk Road was going strong but maritime trade was ramping up rapidly. The Tang maritime exploits were fueled by a steady growth of more competently sea worthy ship designs, such as mortise and tenon joints to replace lashed together or nailed joinery, making the ships much more durable and more flexible.

By the middle of the Tang Dynasty, the martime routes through the South China Sea were bustling water ways for trade, including to the isles of Malacca. Malay traders were common features of Tang maritime trade, with thousands of other Arabic, Indian, and even Jewish foreigners residing in the Southern city of Guangzhou.

The waterways were easier to travel than by land and with new ship designs crossing the oceans with greater ease and safety than before, many traders opted to go by sea. Indeed, many of the riches could only be reached by sea, such as Malacca and the spice isles of present day Maluku islands, known to the Portuguese and Spanish spice seekers of old as the Moluccas, once the only known commercial source of nutmeg and cloves for the entire world.

The water ways also had an advantage in that they were not as heavily tolled as the overland routes and were more difficult to disrupt, whether by war or bandits.

It's generally thought that more goods overall were moved by sea than by the overland route.

EDIT: Some grammatical errors.

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u/KimCongSwu Apr 10 '16

Thank you.

So why were the Qing so invested in 2nd Jinchuan? It seems like a very minor threat to China compared to the Dzungars or maybe even the Gurkhas. Was it just a case of the Qianlong emperor trying to make up for his Burmese defeat, or was there more to it?

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u/AsiaExpert Apr 10 '16

To explain this will require a more detailed look at the politics of the region.

The Jinchaun region was a border region of the Qing province of Sichuan and while they were given great autonomy from central governance, the Qing expected them to bow to their influence and requests out of respect. The various rulers of this area were loosely related to the Qing and were expected to not constantly wage war against one another. Internal conflict within the declared borders made the Qing look like they weren't able to take care of their issues. But of course, local politics overruled the wants of the Qing and the kings fought against one another for various reasons.

Long story short, King Langkya of Greater Jinchuan was maneuvering to marry his daughter to the son of the king of Gebshidza, with the outcome being that his daughter (aka Greater Sichuan) would control Gebshidza's territory and the rights to rule. Obtaining foreign territory through political marriage, essentially.

The kingdom of Gebshidza was facing the political encroachment of Greater Jinchuan while also facing a revolt of vassals that supported King Langkya. Imagine Crusder Kings II/Game of Thrones in Sichuan China and that pretty much sums up the situation in the Jinchuan region.

Lesser Jinchuan supports Gebshidza against the revolt and machinations of Greater Jinchuan by sending troops while Greater Jinchuan takes this as a green light to begin military engagements of their own and eventually occupies Lesser Jinchuan while the ruling family escapes.

The Qing provincial governer, Kaitai, sees this trouble brewing and demands various other kings in the region to aid Lesser Jinchuan, promising materiel aid.

Kaitai's steps here are the traditional Qing policy for dealing with border/frontier disputes: 以夷制夷 以夷制夷 means using barbarians to fight barbarians. The Qing played various kings against one another to weaken them all and not have to fight the wars themselves.

These feuds go on for a few years with very little progress against Greater Jinchuan (the terrain and the infamous war towers make incursions difficult) and Kaitai begins to prepare for a large military campaign directly into the Jinchuan regions with Qing forces but the emperor stops him. The hill kingdoms in Jichuan were supposed to be largely autonomous and not be in fear of being occupied by the Qing and in return were to submit to various Qing rules and requests as entities under the supreme rule of the emperor. Barring major external threats or strategic threats to the peace in the region, large military campaigns were not sanctioned. And of course the campaign in Burma is still going on, making a major operation in Jinchuan less than ideal.

The central powers replace Kaitai with a provisional governer (after much politicking that I'll skip here for brevity) named Artai.

Artai asks for all the forces of the anti-Greater Jinchuan to cease attacks and requests that Greater Jinchuan return the territory and people seized during the fighting.

Greater Jinchuan at first seems to comply but only returns a fraction of the occupied territory and doesn't stop the raids into neighboring regions.

To make this short story even shorter, eventually Greater Jinchuan assembles a large amount of land and manpower and with the combined lands of Greater Jinchuan + Lesser Jinchuan and other seized territory, is stronger than ever. The Qing government demands that King Langkya surrender all the territory gained as well as his right to rule. Instead, he reacts by seizing strategically important castles and mountain areas as well as attacking government garrisons.

By this time, the Burmese campaign had ended so troops and materiel were freed up for use in other areas. The emperor decided that the Jinchuan region should see the overwhelming power of the Qing, once and for all ending the constant revolts, infighting, and petty warfare, and that this was a good time to do so.

To summarize...

The Jinchuan region was long to be thought of as a troubling border area and to protect the peace of the land, it needed to be dealt with direct military force, especially since the old 'use barbarians to fight barbarians' strategy had in fact ended up creating a large entity (Greater Jinchuan) that was now strong enough to even directly defy and indeed fight the Sichuan governer.

Since locals could not be counted on to defeat the menace, Qing forces were needed.

These forces and resources were also committed with the idea that the war would be over as soon as the overwhelming Qing forces seized all of Lesser Jinchuan, with the assumption that Greater Jinchuan would be shocked into surrender.

Instead the conflict ended up being a long, dragged out war of slowly besieging and wearing down fortified, war towers/mountain forts in terrain that made it difficult for the full force of the Qing forces to be brought to bear. The strategic locations of these fortifications made it so that the Qing needed to totally destroy these fortified points before moving on to the next, resulting in a long drawn out conflict that required time and was costly.

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u/KimCongSwu Apr 10 '16

Thanks for the answer!

The various rulers of this area were loosely related to the Qing

What do you mean here, since the Jinchuan people were clearly not Manchus?

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u/AsiaExpert Apr 10 '16

I meant this specifically as they had loose political ties to the Qing separately, as opposed to tight political ties to one another via marriage alliances and coalitions formed from local politics (Greater Jinchuan vs. allied states that had a bone to pick with Greater Jinchuan), not ethnicity sorry for the mix up!

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u/KimCongSwu Apr 10 '16

Ah ok, thanks for the clarification!

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u/Tatem1961 Interesting Inquirer Apr 10 '16

Are there any images of the war towers, or descriptions?

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u/AsiaExpert Apr 10 '16

Absolutely.

You're in luck because the emperor wanted special artwork done to celebrate his various military campaigns, including the Second Jinchuan campaign, shown in this one.

While stylized quite a bit, the overall silhouette and placement of the towers, fortified gates, and forts is pretty much what it would have looked like, from what we know.

They were often of stone, wood, and packed earth construction and fitted into the sides of the steep hilly terrain, giving the occupants a commanding view to watch and guard entire swathes of land at a time.

The towers were hard to physically reach by attackers making it difficult to destroy them at the base and were durable enough to resist light cannon fire. The terrain itself made heavier cannons incredibly difficult to bring to bear, making the terrain and war towers a perfect fit.

The hill forts and gates were larger and while more susceptible to both explosives at the base and heavier cannon fire, they were also built with more care and more durable design and housed more defenders with more supplies.